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940 P.2d 539 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); State v. Robinson. 860
P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). "However, this
court may find an abuse of discretion only if we conclude that 'no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649,651
(Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted).
2.

Did the fact that defense counsel did not request a separate restitution
hearing violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel?

"When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal, the claim will be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit decision
of the issue." State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Humphries. 818P.2d 1027,1029 (Utah 1991)). "Where the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel 'is raised for the first time on direct appeal, we must decide whether defendant
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.'" State v. Cosev,
873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 466
(Utah App. 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), set forth in Addendum A.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 980044-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a restitution order requiring defendant to pay $882.00 as part
of his sentence for theft, a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1995),
in the Second Judicial Court of Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jon M.
Memmott, Judge, presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial judge err where, at the request of defendant's counsel and
with the input and apparent acquiescence of defendant, the court
imposed an order of restitution as part of defendant's sentence without
conducting a separate hearing on the restitution issue?

A trial court's order of restitution will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial
court exceeded the authority prescribed by law or abused its discretion. State v. McBride,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on October 20,1997 with one count of third-degree felony
theft under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R.l). A bench trial was held December
26, 1997 (R. 52). After both parties rested, the court convicted defendant and sentenced
him to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years (R. 18). The
court ordered defendant to pay restitution of $882.00.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 21, 1998 (R. 19).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant pocketed $1,831.00 in payments from his employer's client while
inducing his employer to pay $1,369.00 for goods and services received by that client.
Brad Howard owned Landscape Express, Inc., a landscaping business (R. 52 at 8).
Howard met defendant in March 1997 (id. ai 9). When Howard learned that defendant
had some background and experience in landscaping work, he suggested that defendant
come to work for him (id. at 10).
As the relationship progressed, Howard's trust in defendant grew, and he gave
defendant more authority (id. at 11). Defendant acted as job-site foreman on several
landscaping projects (id. at 10). He proved to be shrewd at dealing with customers, and
brought in, in Howard's words, "some pretty good income'1 for the business (id. at 11).
Howard and defendant discussed becoming business partners. Howard had his attorney
draw up papers to formalize the relationship, but defendant declined to become a partner
3

when he became concerned that he would have to take on some of the company's accrued
debt (id.).
In late July or early August, Howard and defendant met with the Crimin family to
discuss landscaping the Crimins' residential property (id. at 14-5). Defendant negotiated
an $ 185000.00 contract with the Crimins for excavating, building a retaining wall, putting
in plants, laying sod and installing drains (id. at 16). Over the course of the project,
defendant acted as the job-site foreman. Checks from the Crimins pursuant to the contract
were made payable to Landscape Express, and were deposited into the company account.
While the landscaping job was underway, the Crimins decided they wanted a
sunken trampoline, a rose garden, and a sandbox in addition to the work included in the
$18,000 contract. Unknown to Howard, defendant told Mrs. Crimin that if she made
checks for the additional work payable to him rather than to Landscape Express, it would
save her money (id. at 72). She wrote three checks payable to defendant totaling
$1,831.00 (id. at 73).
All the vendors and laborers who took part in the additional work were paid in full
out of Landscape Express's bank account (id- at 25). Howard calculated that the
company's expenditures for the additional work totaled $1,369.45 (id. at 44; State's
Exhibit nos. 1, 3, 4, 6, and 12; R.52 at 21-23, 42-44).
Defendant admitted at trial that none of the $1,831.00 he received from Mrs.
Crimin was paid to Landscape Express (id. at 131). He also testified that Howard had not
4

paid him the $517.00 he was owed for his last week of work on the Crimin project (id. at
114). Howard acknowledged that he withheld defendant's last paycheck (id. at 47, 58).
Defendant claimed that Howard owed him $2,370.00 in overtime pay (id. at 114).
He said, "[Howard] held my overtime out till he was better financially stable . . . . [W]e
discussed I wouldn't be paid overtime at the time because they couldn't afford it" (id. at
153-4). Howard testified, "I did receive something from the workers, you know,
Workforce, Utah Job Corps," but stated that he had not been aware of defendant's claim
for overtime until after defendant left Landscape Express (id. at 175-76).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found defendant guilty of theft for depriving
Landscape Express of the three checks totaling $1,831.00, and using services of
Landscape Express amounting to $1,369.00 (id. at 187-88). The court asked defendant
if he wanted a presentence report prepared before his sentence was imposed. The
following discussion took place:
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I have advised Mr. Blanchard
of his right to have the presentence report
done. He informs me he': 2t the prison, he
doesn't feel that it would do any good, that
they would recommend a prison
commitment. That's my understanding
based on his history. . . . Mr. Harward
[prosecuting attorney] has talked to us
previously about sentencing today, and it's
my understanding the State will not object
to concurrent time. The main issue here
would be restitution, and we'd ask you to
order that as you felt was appropriate.
5

Have I stated everything correctly, Mr.
Blanchard?
Defendant:
[Inaudible] restitution.
[Prosecutor]:
That's correct. I do have comments and
judgments [inaudible].
Defendant:
[Inaudible] my payroll commences.
[Prosecutor]:
And I'm willing to recommend that the
sentence commitment be concurrent with
the term he's now serving. We do want an
order of restitution. I guess there are
different ways you can approach this,
because we're claiming—
The court:
Well, let me tell you that I would probably
order a restitution in this case, in that if it
wants to be different from that or argued,
I would argue that restitution of the
$ 1,821l for the three checks. Less an offset
for the last payroll check that he's due.. .
. So it would the 500 - what is it, 31?
17.
Defendant:
So it would $1,821 minus $517. So it
The court:
would be $1304.
[Prosecutor]:
Yes.
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, the victim here, Paul
Howard, gave an itemized statement to the
Court, and it totaled $1,300. The $600 out
of the $1,821 that you've mentioned was
actually given for topsoil or it went toward
topsoil, was paid off, as I understood.
The court:
Well, my understanding is that he got a
check for that topsoil already.2 This is

*The three checks actually totaled $1,831.00.
2

Howard testified that he paid defendant $600 to reimburse him for topsoil that
defendant purchased for the Crimin job with defendant's personal check (id. at 58-9).
Defendant claimed that "[t]o my knowledge, I don't think I ever have been [reimbursed
for the topsoil]" (id. at 114). However, he stated on cross-examination that "I don't know
6
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IV

[Defense counsel]:
[Prosecutor]:
[Defense counsel]:
[Prosecutor]:
The court:
[Prosecutor]:

The court:
[Defense counsel]:
Defendant:
[Defense counsel]:

Defendant:

[Defense counsel]:

money that he received from Mrs. Crimin
for this job, went in, and should have been
paid to Landscape Express. I mean, I
believe that the CourtDo you w ant to have a hearing, or do we
want to it-I mean.
I think it's better the way the court did it.
the $1,821 minusWith an offset for theLast week's wages.
And then both parties need to be advised,
this doesn't affect any civil claim one
wayAnything for overtime or any of that stuff
will have to be dealt with separately.
You can still sue.
Not from incarceration you can't.
You need to let the court know if you feel
comfortable- Your order, then, would
actually be for'Cause I think it should be-he should
not be entitled to earn a profit on the
side jobs where I did all the labor
myself.
If he's only out thirteen
hundred and something dollars in
materials and labor, as you're claiming,
then my $500[3] should be subtracted
from that and difference should be paid
to him.
I wonder if we could ask him-

if I've have [sic] been or have not been . . . I don't have any knowledge of being
reimbursed 'cause the job has not been reconciled yet" (id. at 136). On rebuttal, the
prosecution introduced a $600 Landscape Express check signed by defendant, payable to
defendant, and marked "topsoil Crimiii" (id. at 173-5). The court expressly resolved the
issue against defendant (id. at 187).
3

Defendant was apparently referring to his withheld final paycheck.
7

[Defendant]:

The court:
[Defense counsel]:

The court:
[Defense counsel]:
[Prosecutor]:

The court:
[Prosecutor]:
The court:
[Prosecutor]:

Defendant:
[Prosecutor]:
Defendant:
[Defense counsel]:
[Prosecutor]:
[Defense counsel]:
[Prosecutor]:
Defendant:
[Prosecutor]:

'Cause I figure I owe him about $500.
That was stated in the original phone
conversation.
Well, if he's willing to accept that, I
meanWhy don't we find out from Mr. Howard
if he's willing to accept the-it would
actually take it down to about $800 and
something, the thirteen that he asked for
minusIt would be, what, $1,369?
$1,369.
In the context of restitution, in a criminal
case, he would accept a restitution order
for the amount, the $1,300 that he$1,369.
-less the$517.
Yes. However, here's something he's
going-the tools and things that you're
holding for collateral,^ he wants to know
if he can get permission, some way of
getting recovery theI have a $30 trailer hitch, but it's locked in
the back of a storage unit, so .. .
Okay. If I couldI could send him a check for 30 bucks
sometime.
Do you want to add 30 ontoCan we add that on?
You keep the hitch.
Okay.
I don't have any other tools.
All right.

4

Howard testified that defendant had kept a trailer hitch, a tape measure, and other
tools that belonged to Howard. He said defendant told him that he was keeping the tools
as "collateral" (id. at 53).
8

The court:

Then the Court will enter the following
sentence to the charge of theft, a felony of
the third degree. The defendant is
sentenced to Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate teAm of zero to five years.
Restitution is set in the amount $882, that
was the $1369 paid by Landscape Express
less the $517 wages withheld, so it would
be an offset for the wage claim, and then
there would be $30 for the trailer hitch.
The Court would order an additional $250
for public defender fees. The Court will
order that sentence to run concurrent with
any present sentence in the Utah State
Prison.

R. 52. at 188-92, Addendum B (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that, in light of his" clear objection to the imposition, amount and
distribution of restitution," the trial court err:d in failing to allow him a full restitution
hearing. Appellant's Brief at 12. Defendant's claims are not supported by the record,
which shows that defendant himself negotiated the restitution amount in open court.
Defendant requested that the court subtract "my $50u" from the "thirteen hundred and
something" paid out by the victim, and "the difference should be paid to him" (id. at 19091). There was no error in the trial court's failure to conduct a separate restitution hearing
where defendant requested that restitution be determined and then assisted in the court's
calculation of the amount. Even if the court had erred, defendant invited the error by
suggesting to the court the formula ultimately used in determining restitution.
9

Defendant further maintains that, in determining restitution, the court erred in
failing to consider the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp 1998).
This issue is not adequately briefed, and this Court should accordingly decline to address
it. If the Court does decide to address the merits, it should affirm the restitution order
because defendant, in asking the court to determine restitution, effectively acknowledged
that no factors making restitution inappropriate were present, and actively waived the
entry of formal findings. Additionally, even if the Court finds that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the subsection 8(c) factors on the record, any error was harmless. The
restitution ordered was a trivial amount ($882) and, inasmuch as the theft occurred in the
context of the defendant's employment, there was ample evidence in the record that
defendant had job skills enabling him to earn money to reimburse his victim. Defendant
has not shown a reasonable probability that, absent the alleged error, a different outcome
would have occurred.
Finally, defendant urges this Court to find that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney below failed to object to Uic court* s restitution order and
to request a separate restitution hearing. Under the two-part test for ineffective assistance
claims set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, defendant's claim
fails because he has failed to show either (1) that his attorney's conduct in failing to object
and request a hearing on restitution fell below an objective standard of reasonable

10

professional judgment, or (2) that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different if a separate restitution hearing had been held.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DETERMINING RESTITUTION WITHOUT
HOLDING A SEPARATE HEARING ON THE ISSUE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998) requires that "[i]f the defendant
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." However, in order to
receive a separate hearing, defendant must first object to the imposition amount, or
distribution of restitution. Absent such an objection, the statute does not require a hearing.
Here, the record does not reflect that any cbjection was made. Thus, no restitution
hearing was required.
A.
The Record Does Not Support Defendant's Claim that He Objected to the
Imposition, Amount or Distribution of Restitution.
Defendant maintains that he "clearly expressed his objection to the imposition,
amount, and distribution of the contemplated restitution." Appellant's Brief at 15.
However, the record in this case proves that the court did not determine the restitution
issue sua sponte, but was invited by defense counsel to resolve the matter. After the court
rendered its finding of guilt, defendant's counsel stated that M[t]he main issue here would

11

be restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was appropriate. Have I stated
that correctly, Mr. Blanchard?" (R. 52 at 188-89). Defendant's response was "[Inaudible]
restitution

[Inaudible] my payroll commences" (|d- at 189). Then, as noted above,

defendant supplied the court with the formula it ultimately used in determining the award
of restitution. Finally, defendant further participated in the restitution colloquy by
volunteering, on the subject of his retention of the victim's tools, that "I have a $30 trailer
hitch, but it's locked in the back of a storage unit, so . . . I could send him a check for 30
bucks sometime" (id. at 191-2). Defendant's comments were not those of an individual
objecting to the "imposition, amount or distribution" of restitution, but one actively
participating in determining the appropriate amount.
The statements in the record to which defendant refers in support of his claim that
he objected to restitution fail to support his contentions. See Appellant's Brief at 14.
When the court proposed determining restitution by totaling the three checks written by
Mrs. Crimin and subtracting the amount of defendant's withheld final paycheck, defendant
did, as he argues on appeal, express his dissatisfaction * vith the court's proposed restitution
formula by stating that "he [the victim] should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side
jobs where I did all the labor myself (R. 52 at 190). However, defendant followed that
sentence by arguing that "If he's only out thirteen hundred and something dollars in
materials and labor, as you're claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted from that and

12

difference paid to him" (id. at 190-91). The court obligingly adopted defendant's formula
for determining restitution, resolving the issue exactly as he requested.
Defendant also points to his statement that "I figure I owe him about $500. That
was stated in the original phone conversation" as an expression of his objection to the
restitution award (id.). On appeal, defendant interprets that remark as an assertion that "he
only owed Mr. Howard 'about $500.'" Appellant's Brief at 14 (emphasis added). That
construction is not consistent with the rest of the record. At trial, Howard testified that he
and defendant had a telephone conversation in which defendant offered to pay Howard
$500 up front and then pay back the rest of the money later (id. at 50-1). Defendant
admitted in testimony that during the phone conversation he told Howard that "[i]f there
was any money owing to him, yeah, I would give him the $500 and make payments" (id.
at 149) (emphasis added). Defendant's testimony regarding the telephone conversation
constituted an acknowledgment that an amount greater than $500 might be owed. His
other testimony was vague as to how much was owed.5 In light of his previous
contradictory or ambiguous statements, the judge would not have interpreted his statement
that "IfigureI owe him about $500" as an assertion that he only owed Howard $500. The
statement, taken in combination with (1) his urging seconds earlier that the court
determine restitution by subtracting "my $500" (defendant's final paycheck) from the

5

Defendant asserted that "[t]he financial thing was never settled up on this job" (R.
52 at 40).
13

"thirteen hundred and something" and (2) his testimony that he agreed to "give [Howard]
the $500 and make payments," is ambiguous at best. It cannot be regarded as a clear
expression of objection.
The record simply does not support defendant's claim that he objected to the
imposition, amount or distribution of restitution. Therefore, under the clear language of
the statute, the court was not required to hold a restitution hearing.
B.

Defendant Assisted the Trial Court in Determining the Amount of Restitution
and Invited the Result of Which He Now Complains.
As argued supra, the record does not support defendant's claim that the court erred

in failing to grant him a separate restitution hearing. However, even if error Had occurred,
it was error invited by defendant. In State v. Dunn, the Utah Supreme Court wrote that
"[w]e have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing error." 850 P.2d
1201,1220 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah App. 1991).
Here, defendant supplied the court with the formula it used in determining his restitution
obligation, and gave every indication that he acquiesced in the court's order. He now
complains on appeal about an alleged error he led the trial court into committing. In
accordance with the doctrine of invited error, this Court should refuse to consider his
claim, and should affirm the restitution order.

14

C.

Even Assuming Arguendo that the Trial Court Erred, Defendant Was Not
Prejudiced by the Court's Failure to Conduct a Separate Restitution Hearing.
Defendant asserts that the failure to conduct a separate hearing on restitution was

harmful because evidence was presented at trial that Howard owed defendant $2,370.00
in overtime pay.6 Defendant appears to contend that the amount of overtime pay owed
him would have been taken into account at a restitution hearing, and that a different result
would have been occurred. Defendant's argument lacks merit because defendant's
unrelated civil wage claim would not have been an appropriate subject of inquiry in the
context of a criminal restitution hearing.
Restitution is an aspect of criminal sentencing. Under the terms of the sentencing
statute, restitution is available for a victim's pecuniary damages. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(l)(d)(Supp. 1997). "Pecuniary damages" are defined as "all special damages, but not
general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c)(Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). The plain words of the
statute restrict the inquiry to a determination of what damages resulted from the
defendant's criminal activities.
6

Defendant asserts that he "submitted copies of payroll checks as evidence" of his
entitlement to overtime pay. Appellant's Brief at 17. In fact, no checks were offered or
admitted at trial, and the only evidence of the existence of an overtime issue was
defendant's testimony (R. 52 at 114).

15

Neither the restitution statute nor the case law make any provision for a defendant
to inject an unrelated counterclaim into a criminal restitution determination. Defendant
has failed to raise or brief any basis for concluding that in a restitution hearing, the trial
court would have been required to consider the alleged overtime owed defendant and to
offset the amount of restitution ordered accordingly. Defendant has therefore failed to
show that the alleged error was harmful. Consequently, the restitution order should be
affirmed.
D.

Defendant Received Notice of the Charge Against Him and an Opportunity
to Be Heard. Therefore, He Was Not Denied Due Process.
Defendant claims that the court's failure to conduct a full hearing on restitution

deprived him of due process, in that he did not receive timely and adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Appellant's Brief at 16. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
A defendant has no automatic right to a separate restitution hearing.

The

restitution statute provides that a full hearing is required if the defendant objects to the
imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution. Conversely, if a defendant does not
object, the court may impose restitution without a hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201 (4)(e) (Supp. 1997). Here, defendant affirmatively requested imposition of restitution
(R. 52 at 188-89).
The restitution statute also states that "[w]hen a person is convicted of a criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime

"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). Defendant's crime
clearly resulted in pecuniary damages, making the imposition of restitution in this case
mandatory rather than discretionary. See State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417,420 (Utah 1987).
Due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution requires that prior
to a deprivation of property a person must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
See, e,g., Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d
1207, 1211 (Utah 1983); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 761
(Utah App. 1990). However, defendant did receive notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In Burlett v. Holden, an inmate complained that he was deprived of due process
when the Department of Corrections ordered him to pay restitution as a consequence of
a disciplinary violation. 835 P.2d989,991 (UiahApp. 1992). This Court ruled that since
the inmate was provided with notice of the disciplinary charges against him and was given
the opportunity for a hearing on those charges, his rights to due process were not violated
by the imposition of restitution. Id.
Defendant received ample due process under Burlett. He was notified of the
allegations against him by the information, which charged him with committing thirddegree felony theft for stealing property or services worth a minimum of $1,000 but not
more than $5,000 (R. 1). The amount of the victim's loss was directly relevant to the
degree of felony with which defendant was charged. Defendant does not deny that he
17

received sufficient notice of the issues to be determined at his trial, nor that the value of
the property or services stolen was one of those issues.
Furthermore, defendant received a full hearing on the issues before the trial court.
He was provided an opportunity to contest the imposition of restitution during the
restitution colloquy. The restitution colloquy itself took the form of a hearing. The trial
court entertained argument from defendant regarding the amount of restitution to be
imposed, including the offset for defendant's final paycheck, and the prosecutor proffered
the victim's testimony that the figure of $882.00 would be acceptable to him. Finally, the
court determined the restitution amount exactly as defendant requested.
Having received notice of the issues to be determined and an opportunity to be
heard before the court regarding the matters at issue, defendant received due process.
E.

The Fact that the Trial Court's Did Not Consider the Factors Listed in Section
76-3-201(8Kc) on the Record Does Not Warrant Reversal of the Restitution
Order,
Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to consider the factors set forth in

section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) on the record. Appellant's Brief at 17. Defendant mentions this
issue only incidently, and the matter is cursorily briefed. See id. Since the claim is
inadequately briefed, this Court should decline to address it. However, even if the Court
decides to reach the merits, the Court should affirm the restitution order because
defendant, in asking the trial court to determine restitution, acknowledged that there was
no impediment to the imposition of restitution, and actively waived the entry of findings.
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Finally, even if the court erred in failing to consider the Subsection 8(c) factors on the
record, defendant was not prejudiced thereby.
Inadequate Briefing. Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
party to an appeal must provide an argument containing the "contentions and reasons of
the [party] with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on." Utah's appellate courts have ruled that when a party fails to
comply with this rule, the court will decline to address the issue because "a reviewing
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of irgument and
research."

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988); see also Burns v.

Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. Ap; 1996); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599,602
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). Here, defendant has failed to adequately brief the issue of whether
findings were required under Subsection 8(b), and the court should accordingly decline
to consider it.
Affirmative Waiver. Even if the issue of lack of explicit findings in the record
under Subsection 8(c) had been adequately briefed, defendant's request that the trial court
determine restitution acted as an acknowledgment that the Subsection 8(c) factors imposed
no barrier to the imposition of full restitution. Hence, defendant waived entry of specific
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findings-not merely by failing to object to the court's determination of restitution, but by
affirmatively requesting imposition of restitution.
Subsection 8(c) provides that
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors
listed in Subsection (8)(b)[7] and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with
regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an
installment basis or on other conditions to befixedby the
court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines
make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(8) (Supp. 1997).
When a defendant's criminal activity has resulted in pecuniary damages, the
imposition of restitution is mandatory. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998).
"The trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution unless the court
finds that restitution is inappropriate." State v. Snvder, 7^7 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987).
Here, defendant's request that the court determine restitution acted as an acknowledgment

7

The "factors listed in Subsection 8(b)" are " (i) the cost of the damage or loss if
the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the
offense; (ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care . . . and (iii) the cost of necessary
funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (Supp. 1998).
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that restitution was appropriate. The Subsection 8(c) factors involve matters which,
depending on a defendant's circumstances, could conceivably operate to either make the
payment of restitution inappropriate, or to reduce the amount appropriate. In this case,
defendant - having full knowledge of the nominal monetary sums at issue — asked the
court to impose restitution. In effect, defendant represented to the court that no factors
making full restitution inappropriate were present. Therefore, defendant waived formal
findings on the Subsection 8(c) factors.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "failure to make required findings may result
in plain error." State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937,940 (Utah 1996). "Plain error" is (1) error
that should have been obvious to the trial court, (2) which is harmful to the defendant.
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied. Eldredge v. Utah. 493 U.S. 814
(1989). However, "if trial counsel's action? amounted to an active, as opposed to a
passive, waiver of an objection, we may decline to consider the claim of plain error."
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
Such an active waiver may occur when the alleged error I, "the result of a consciously
chosen strategy of trial counsel.... If the decision was conscious and did not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel,[8] . . . the failure to object should be treated as a
conscious waiver and should preclude further consideration of the issue." Id at 158-59.

defendant's ineffective assistance claim is discussed infra at 25-28.
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In State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712,716-17 (Utah App. 19971 cert. denied,953 P.2d449
(Utah 1998); this Court held that there was no error in a trial court's failure to enter
findings supporting admission of hearsay testimony because defense counsel had made
a conscious decision to permit the testimony as part of trial strategy. In this case, the
record demonstrates that trial counsel had a strategic purpose in asking the trial court to
determine restitution, thereby waiving the entry of Subsection 8(c) findings. The record
indicates that defendant had been previously sentenced on September 23,1988 to a zeroto-five-year term for third-degree forgery (R. 24). On December 23, 1994, he received
concurrent one-to-fifteen-year sentences for two counts of second-degree forgery (R. 23,
25). It is therefore apparent that he was either on parole or probation in August 1997,
when the offense in this case was committed. At the beginning of the restitution colloquy,
defense counsel stated that "[The prosecutor] \ as talked to us previously about sentencing
today, and it's my understanding the State will not object to concurrent time. The main
issue here would be restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was appropriate"
(R. 52 at 188). Here, the prosecution's willingness to agree that his sentence for theft run
concurrently rather than consecutively with his three prior forgery sentences could well
have been conditioned (implicitly or explicitly) on defendant's acceptance of his
obligation to pay full restitution. There was therefore a "conceivable strategic purpose"
in defense counsel's conscious waiver of findings as to Subsection 8(c).

22

In light of defendant's conscious decision, based on trial strategy, to waive the
entry of findings, this Court should decline to consider defendant's claim of error, and
should affirm the restitution order.
Harmless Error. In any event, if this Court determines that the failure of the court
to consider the 8(c) factors on the record resulted in plain error, the error did not result in
prejudice to defendant. Therefore, under the second element of plain error analysis, the
error was harmless.
In State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held
that even though a trial court erred in failing to make its reasons for ordering restitution
part of its written order, the error was not prejudicial. In that case, the court held that
restitution was clearly appropriate because the record showed that the defendant had stolen
and dissipated investors' assets, and that he was capable of repaying investors because he
was employed at the time of trial. Id.
In the present case, any theoretical error was harmless because even if the court had
addressed the Subsection 8(c) factors on the record, the restitution order would have been
the same.

The amount of restitution ordered was a minimal sum ($882) which,

realistically, could have been repaid even by an incarcerated person. In addition, where
defendant's crime was committed in the course of his employment, there was evidence in
the record indicating that defendant had job skills and the ability to work. Therefore, as
in Snyder, the lack of findings as to the Subsection 8(c) factors was harmless.
23

Defendant has failed to brief or even allege any grounds to conclude that the trial
court's failure to make findings under Subsection 8(c) was harmful to him. Consequently
his claim fails under a plain error analysis, and the restitution order should be affirmed.
POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
REQUEST A SEPARATE RESTITUTION HEARING
DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant claims that "trial counsel's failure to timely object to the trial court's
imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." Appellant's Brief at 19-20. Defendant's claim is not
supported by applicable law or by the facts.
Utah appellate courts follow the two-part test for determining whether counsel
provided ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
That standard provides that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d
803, 805 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 0994); see also Tavlor v. Warden. 905
P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). Both elements must be presem in order to demonstrate
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ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,874
(Utah 1993).

In addition, "[p]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a

speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,
877 (Utah 1993).
A.

Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate that Trial Counsel's Failure to Object
to the Imposition of Restitution Fell Below an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness Because (1) There was a Reasonable Strategic Basis for
Counsel's Failure to Object and (2) An Objection to the Restitution Order
Would Have Been Futile.
"In evaluating defense counsel's strategy under an ineffective-assistance analysis,

' we give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such
decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v Hall 946 P.2d
712, 719-20 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996);
cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). Here, as discussed supra at 22-23, defense
counsel was apparently mindful of the fact that, in light of defendant's three previous
felony convictions, the prosecution could have advocated that his prison sentence for theft
run consecutively with his sentences for the prior convictions. Defense counsel therefore
reasonably could have believed that the prosecutor's failure to press for consecutive time
was conditioned on defendant's acceptance of his obligation to pay full restitution.
Consequently, there was a reasonable strategic basis for defense counsel's failure to object
to the trial court's restitution determination. Therefore, the failure to object did not
constitute objectively deficient performance. Hall 946 P.2d at 720.
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Additionally, "[t]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would
be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d
1101,1109 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Malmrose. 949 P.2d 56,58 (Utah 1982)). Here,
defendant's liability was clear. In addition, the appropriate amount to be ordered was
readily determinable from the documentary and testimonial evidence, and the identity of
the victim was undisputed. Furthermore, as discussed supra at 14-16, neither the
restitution statute, case law, nor appellant's brief provide any authority for the proposition
that defendant would have been entitled to raise his claim for overtime wages in a
restitution hearing.9 In light of the foregoing, defense counsel apparently recognized that
an objection to the imposition, amount, or distribution of restitution would have been futile
because a full restitution hearing would not have eliminated or reduced defendant's
restitution obligation.
In summary, the prosecutor's willingness to agree to concurrent sentencing
provided reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel's failure to object to the imposition of
restitution. In any event, defense counsel apparently recognized that an objection would
have been futile. Consequently, under the first element of Strickland, defendant has failed
to prove that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

9

Indeed, the trial court may, if anything, nave committed error in defendant's favor
by allowing an offset for the $517 in withheld wages.
26

B.

Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate that Trial Counsel's Performance
Resulted in Prejudice,
Under the second prong of Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that but for his counsel's deficient performance, a different result would have
occurred.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Defendant has failed to carry this burden by

showing that his restitution obligation would have been reduced if trial counsel had
objected to the imposition, amount or distribution of restitution. The facts of this case
demonstrate that of two possible formulas foi determining restitution, the court used the
formula creating the smaller restitution obligation. When asked to determine restitution,
the court expressed its inclination to determine restitution based upon the value of the
checks defendant received from Mrs. Crimin and failed to turn over to Landscape Express
(R.52 at 189). The defendant asked the court to base the restitution award on the lesser
sum of $ 1,369 expended by Landscape Express (id. at 190-91). The court gave defendant
exactly what he asked for, imposing the lower restitution figure (id. at 192).
Additionally, even if a separate hearing had been held, defendant has asserted no
basis to conclude that the amount of restitution assessed against defendant could be offset
by the value of defendant's unrelated wage claim. See pp. 14-16 herein. Therefore, since
the amount of restitution ordered would not have been different, defendant suffered no
prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to object to the imposition, amount,
distribution of restitution.
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In this case, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because he has not shown that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that
he was prejudiced thereby. Since neither component of the Strickland test has been
demonstrated, his argument fails.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the restitution order.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing —
Definitions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation ..nd as further defined in
Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (lXe).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4Xc) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of
the order to the parties.

(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77,
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete
restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be
determined as provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment,
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes i. Men when recorded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action.
Interest shall accrue on the amount orderedfromthe time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.

(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged wich an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported,
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants
actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child,
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over
any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense
resulted in the death of a victim.

(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for courtordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8Xb) t and^^ c i a i ^ ^ rf ^ ^ ^
burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
.
f
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment oi
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to
provide restitution to the victim.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 5f>, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch.
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19;
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995,
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch.
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2,3; 1998, ch. 149,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch 111, effective May 1, 1995, added
"or for conduct for which the defendant has
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement" and made a related change in Subsection (4)(a)(i)
The 1995 amendment by ch 117, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection
(lXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "person convicted" in Subsection (2), and added
Subsections (4)(a)(ui) and (4)(d)(ni)
The 1995 amendment by ch 301, effective
May 1, 1995, added aand as further defined in
Subsection (4)(c)" at the end of Subsection
(lXd), rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the criteria and procedures for ordering restitution,
added Subsection (8), and made several stylistic changes
The 1995 amendment by ch 337, effective
Apnl 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redesignated former Subsection (2)(g) as Subsection
(2)(h), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc),
requiring sentencing to the aggravated mandatory term m cases of substantial bodily injury to
children during the commission of child kidnapping or various listed child sexual assaults

The 1995 (1st S S ) amendment, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for
"May 1, 199*" in Subsection (2Xg)
The 1996 amendment by ch 40, effective
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection
(2Xg), which read "on or after April 29,1996, to
imprisonment at not less than five years and
which may be for Lfe for an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-3011
and 76-5-302, or" and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2Xg), deleted
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing
under Subsection (6), and added Subsection (7)
The 1996 amendment by ch 79, effective
Apnl 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted
"remove 1 or disqualification from" for "removal
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection
(4Xa)(i) adde 1 "Section" before "77-37-2 "
The 1996 amendment by ch 241, §§ 2 and 3,
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections
(4)(a)(vn) and (4)(d)(iv)
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,1998,
in Subsection (4Xa)(i) substituted "Subsection
(lXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and
family member has the meaning as defined m
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the
style of the internal references in Subsections
(5Xc)(i), (5Xc)(n), and (8Xc)
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch 301,
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch 117 to
Subsection (4Xa)(in) shall merge into this section, as amended by ch 301, as Subsection
(4Xa)(vi).
Laws 1995, ch 337 was effective May 1,1995,
however, § 76-3-201 3 postponed the amendment of this section by ch 337 until April 29,
1996

Addendum B

1

from the Court, that there is evidence or proof beyond a

2

reasonable doubt that he did obtain those checks and use

3

those services intentionally and knowing to deprive the

4

owner, Mr. Howard, of the property and that the value of

5

that property was more than $1,000 and less than $5,000, and

6

that these events occurred during August of 1977 in Davis

7

County, State of Utah.

8
9
10
11

On the basis of those findings, the Court would
find the defendant guilty of the crime of theft, a felony of
the third degree.
Now, Mr. Blanchard, you have a right to be

12

sentenced in not less than two or more than forty-five days.

13

Would you like a presentence report in this case before we

14

set sentencing in this matter?

15

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Your Honor, I have advised Mr.

16

Blanchard of his right to have the presentence report done.

17

He informs me he's at the prison, he doesn't feel that it

18

would do any good, that they would recommend a prison

19

commitment.

20

I feel the same way, that they would probably, in all

21

likelihood, recommend a prison commitment.

22

That's my understanding based on his history.

Mr. Harward has talked to us previously about

23

sentencing today, and it's my understanding the State will

24

not object to concurrent time.

The main issue here would be

25 J restitution, and we'd ask you to order that as you felt was
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1

appropriate.

2

Have I stated everything correctly, Mr. Blanchard?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

MR. HARWARD:

5

That's correct*

I do have comments

and judgments [inaudible].

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

MR. HARWARD:

8

[Inaudible] restitution.

[Inaudible: ry payroll commences.

And I'm willing to recommend that

the sentence commitment be concurrent with the term he's now

9 J serving.

We do want an order of restitution,

I guess there

10

are different ways you can approach this, because we're

11

claiming

12

—
THE COURT:

Well, let me tell you that I would

13

probably order a restitution in this case, in that if it

14

wants to be different from that or argued, I would argue

15

that .restitution of the $l,8fi for the three checks, less an

16

offset for the last payroll check that he's due.

17

would the five hundred -- what is it, thirty-one?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

So it

Seventeen.

So it would 1,821 minus $517.

So it

would be $1,304.

21

MR. HARWARD:

22

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Yes.
Your Honor, the victim here, Paul

23

Howard, gave an itemized rtatement to the Court, and it

24

totaled $1,300.

The $600 out of the $1,821 that you've

25 J mentioned was actually given for topsoil or it went toward
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1

topsoil, was paid off, as I understood.

2

THE COURT:

Well, my understanding is that he got

3

a check for that topsoil already.

4

received from Mrs. Crimins for this job, went in, and should

5

have been paid to Landscape Express.

6

the Court

7
8
9
10

MR. ALBRIGHT:
do we want to it —

MR. HARWARD:

I think that's better the way the

Court did it.

12

MR. HARWARD:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HARWARD:

17

Do you want to have a hearing, or

I mean.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

16

The $1,821 minus

~

With an offset for the

—

Last week's wages.
And then both parties need to be

advised, this doesn't affect any civil claim one way
THE COURT:

stuff will have to be dealt with separately.
MR. ALBRIGHT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

MR. ALBRIGHT:
you feel comfortable

You can still sue.
Not from incarceration you can't.
You need to let the Court know if

—

22

Your order, then, would actually be for

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

—

Anything for overtime or any of that

18

21

I mean, I believe that

—

11

15

This is money that he

—

'Cause I tnink it should be —

he

should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs

25 I where I did all the labor myself.

If he's only out thirteen
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1

hundred and something dollars in materials and labor, as

2

you're claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted from that

3

and difference

should be paid

4

MR. ALBRIGHT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

$500.

I wonder if we could ask him —
'Cause I figure I owe him about

That was stated in the original phone conversation.

7
3

to him.

THE COURT: Well, if he's willing to accept that,
I mean —

9

MR. ALBRIGHT: Why don't we find out from Mr.

10

Howard if he's willing to accept the —

11

take it down to about $800 and something, the thirteen that

12

he asked for minus —

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. ALBRIGHT: $1,369.

15

MR. HARWARD:

it would actually

It would be, what, $1,369?

In the context of restitution in a

16

criminal case, he would accept a restitution order for

17

the amount, the $1,300 that he —

18

THE COURT: $1,369.

19

MR. HARWARD:

20

THE COURT: $517.

21"

MR. HARWARD:

-- less the —

Yes. However, here's something he's

22

going

23

collateral, he wants to know if he can get permission, some

24

way of getting recovery the —

25

—

the tools and things that you re holding for

THE DEFENDANT:

I have a $30 trailer hitch, but
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1

itfs locked in the back of a storage unit, so...

2

MR. HARWARD:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

Okay.

If I could —

I could send him a check for 30

bucks sometime.

5

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Do you want to add 30 onto —

6

MR. HARWARD:

7

MR. ALBRIGHT:

8

MR. HARWARD: Okay.

9

THE DEFENDANT:

Can we add that on?
You keep the hitch.

I don't have any other tools.

10

MR. HARWARD: All right.

11

THE COURT:

Then the Court will enter the

12

following sentence to the charge of theft, a felony of the

13

third degree.

14

Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years.

15

Restitution is set in the amount $882, that was the $1,369

16

paid by Landscape Express less the $517 wages withheld, so

17

it would be an offset for the wage claim, and then there

18

would be $30 for the trailer hitch.

19

an additional $250 for public defender fees.

20

would order that sentence to run concurrent with any present

21

sentence in the Utah State Prison.

22

The defendant is sentenced to Utah State

The Court would order
The Court

Now I need to advise you, if you'd like to appeal

23 J the sentence I have entered, you must make that appeal
24

within 30 days.

I don't think there's a question about

25 I that.
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